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RECENT DECISIONS
merits of the unmentioned policy reasons 28 that apparently controlled
the instant decision could be put to an exacting test.
ADRIAN P. SCHOONE
Lack of Good Faith in Collective Bargaining-Petitioners in
collective bargaining negotiations insisted upon a broad management
function clause without an arbitration clause of real value, and also
demanded a no strike clause in the contract. The employees' repre-
sentatives achieved only the concession of grievance and security
clauses which gave the union little voice in the determination of such
matters. Petitioners had also, prior to the bargaining sessions, granted
a unilateral wage raise to certain employees, and had allegedly made
threats and promises to their employees. The National Labor Relations
Board found that the strike that followed was not an unfair labor
practice strike, because the petitioners had failed to bargain in good
faith in failing to concede anything substantial, and in granting the
wage increases. The petition to set aside the order of the Board was
granted respecting the findings and order relating to refusal to bar-
gain in good faith, and to the determination that the strike was an
unfair labor practice strike. White's Uvalde Mines v. NLRB, 42
LRRA 2001 (5th Cir., April 23, 1958).
The statute pertinent here is §8 (d) of the National Labor Re-
lations Act, as amended by the Taft-Hartley Act:'
"(d) For the purpose of this section, to bargain collectively
is the performance of the mutual obligation of employer and
the representative of the employees to meet at reasonable times
and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and
other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of
an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the
execution of a written contract incorporating any agreement
reached if requested by either party, but such obligation does
not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the
making of a concession: ......
This subsection was inserted in the National Labor Relations Act to
give more definiteness to §8 (a) (5)2 of the original Act, which made
it an unfair labor practice for an employer to bargain collectively with
in successive statutory revisions has made no attempt to alter, if any amelior-
ation is required it is now a matter for Congress, not this Court."28 Riordan, supra note 26, admits that a holding of part payment as sufficient
to bring suit would not prevent the Government from utilizing its drastic
remedies. But he feels that such use would produce an unsatisfactory tax
administration because 1) it would affect the taxpayers' willingness to per-
form under our voluntary assessment program; 2) it would be burdensome
to the Government; 3) it might cause hardships to those doing business with
the taxpayer. But the query remains whether these arguments completely
offset the dire circumstances in which many a taxpayer now finds himself.129 U.S.C.A. §158 (d).
229 U.S.C.A. §158 (a) (5).
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the representatives of his employees. There was a clearer elaboration
upon the components of good faith bargaining.'
While the court here found sufficient substantial evidence to sup-
port the Board's finding that the peitioners had interfered with, re-
strained and coerced employees in the exercise of their right to engage
in union and concerted activities, 4 and denied the petition to that ex-
tent, it treated the pay increase by the employer in a different manner.
This latter conduct of the petitioner was summarily disposed of by
the court:
"We think, however, the unilateral increase of pay of five
of the sixty members of the bargaining unit, each of which was
accounted for as being appropriate to the particular individual in
relation to his job, and all of which occurred before the bar-
gaining sessions commenced, did not amount to violations of
either Section 8 (a)(1) or 8 (a)(5) of the Act. These were
not such general increases as were criticized in NLRB v. Cromp-
ton-Highland Mills, 337 U.S. 217, 24 LRRM 2088 and May
Department Stores v. NLRB, 5 Cir., 211 F.2d 843, 33 LRRM
2789. . . . These particular increases were simply in line with
their custom and practice and could not be said to be either
restraint or coercion under 8 (a) (1) or a refusal to bargain
in good faith under 8 (a) (5). " 5
As to the principal issue in the case, that of the employer's con-
tinued insistence upon a contract favorable wholly to itself, and es-
pecially upon the management function clause, the court relied heavily
upon the United State's Supreme Court decision in NLRB v. American
Insurance Co.6 That case clearly demonstrated the Supreme Court's
reluctance to judge substantive terms of the proposed collective bar-
gaining contracts, or to imply a refusal to bargain from the failure to
reach a settlement where the employer will not yield 7 in his demand
for a management function clause.8 The Court held that since such
3 N.L.R.B. v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149 (1956); N.L.R.B. v. American In-
surance Co., 343 U.S. 395 (1952). See also Annot., 100 L. ed. 1035 (1957).
4 This was a violation of §8 (a) (1) : "It shall be an unfair labor practice for
an employer-to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exer-
cise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7, . . ." 29 U.S.C.A. §158 (a) (1).5 White's Uvalde Mines v. N.L.R.B., 42 L.R.R.M. 2001, 2002 (5th Cir. April 23,
1958).
6 343 U.S. 395 (1952).
7 N.L.R.B. v. American Insurance Co., supra note 6; "And it is equally clear
that the Board may not, either directly or indirectly, compel concessions or
otherwise sit in judgment on the substantive terms of collective bargaining
contracts...."
S The management function clause in the case of N.L.R.B. v. American In-
surance Co., supra note 7, at 397, is typical: "The right to select, hire, to
promote, demote, discharge, discipline for cause, to maintain discipline and
efficiency of employees, and to determine the schedules of work is recognized
by both union and company as the proper responsibility and prerogative of
management to be held and exercised by the company, and while it is that
an employee feeling himself to have been aggrieved by any decision of the
company in respect to such matters, or the union on his behalf, shall have a
right to have such a decision reviewed by top management officials of the
[Vol. 42
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a clause was a subject proper for collective bargaining," and Con-
gressional intent was contra to any governmental determination as to
the desirability of terms of labor-management collective agreements, 0
an adamnant demand for a management prerogative clause which
resulted in an impasse in negotiations would not per se amount to bad
faith in bargaining.
The principal case however seems to extend farther the protection
given the employer in his bargaining. It affirms strongly the idea that
no concession need be made,:" and rejects the Board's theory that bad
faith can be based upon the employer's failure to concede anything
substantial.12 Thus, the majority find, there is no substantive evidence
here to support the Board's finding regarding the violation of good
faith in bargaining, because there exists no basis for the contentions
urged in support of it. The dissenting Judge Rives however, felt that
the unilateral wage increases together with the weight which the court
must give the Board's findings under §10 (f) of the Act, 3 would sup-
port a denial of the petition in toto. He further felt that something
was required of the employer to fulfill his duty to bargain in good
faith, and here that was lacking.
The court in the White case showed its recognition of the difficulty
involved in the application of the good faith test :14
"The language of the courts is not, as it cannot be, in con-
struing this difficult statute, entirely clear .....
The standard criterion for the courts in the construction of whether
company under the grievance machinery hereinafter set forth, it is further
agreed that the final decision of the company made by such top management
officials shall not be further reviewable by arbitration."
9N.L.R.B. v. American Insurance Co., supra note 6: "Congress provided
expressly that the Board should not pass upon the desirability of the sub-
stantial terms of labor agreements. Whether a contract should contain a
clause fixing standards for such matters as work scheduling or should provide
for more flexible treatment is an issue for determination across the bargaining
table, not by the Board. If the latter approach is agreed upon, the extent of
union and management participation in the administration of such matters is
itself a condition of employment to be settled by bargaining." This is quite
important, for the finding that such a clause was not a proper subject for
collective bargaining would result in the finding of an unfair labor practice
in not bargaining in good faith, if the employer insisted upon such a clause.
See N.L.R.B. v. Wooster Division of Borg-Warner, 42 L.R.R.M. 2034 (U.S.
Nos. 58 and 78, May 5, 1958).
10 N.L.R.B. v. American Insurance Co., supra note 6; the intent behind Section 8
(a) (5) as described by the Senate Committee: "The Committee wishes to
dispel any possible false impressions that this bill is designed to compel the
making of agreements or to permit governmental supervision of their terms.
It must be stressed that the duty to bargain collectively does not carry with
it the duty to reach an agreement, because the essence of collective bargaining
is that either party shall be free to decide whether proposals made to it are
satisfactory." S. Rep. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1935).
11 White's Uvlade Mines v. N.L.R.B., supra note 5 at 2003.
12 White's Uvalde Mines v. N.L.R.B., supra note 5 at 2003; the court summarizes
the Board's contentions in like terms.
13 §10 (f) of the National Labor Relations Act.
14 White's Uvalde Mines v. N.L.R.B., supra note 5.
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conduct amounts to bad faith has been a rather broad one."5 Hence the
approach of the court in the different cases varies with the particular
circumstances of each. This of course furnishes no guide as to what
will or will not be good faith bargaining in that vast area beyond
flat refusal to negotiate in the first instance. The White decision shows
that the good faith test, although codified by Taft-Hartley into the
National Labor Relations Act, still retains the indefiniteness of §8
(a) (5)16 of the original act. Since, however, it appears that the
existence of good faith can only be determined by an objective evalu-
ation of all of the acts and circumstances in each case, in order to
ascertain the purpose or subjective intention of the parties, 17 the in-
advisability of a more specific rule seems apparent.
The decision in the White case,'8 under the application of the good
faith test, seems to be a well-considered one, which is in conformity
with the statutory recognition of the non-concession privilege and the
Congressional intent that the terms of the agreement be left to the
parties, and not to governmental supervision. However, in finding no
fault with the insistence on a management function clause under §8(d),
the court did caution:
"We do not hold that under no possible circumstances can
the mere content of the various proposals and counterproposals
of management and union be sufficient evidence of a want of
good faith to justify a holding to that effect. We can conceive
of one party to such bargaining procedure suggesting proposals
of such a nature or type or couched in such objectionable lan-
guage that they would be calculated to disrupt any serious
negotiations. "19
ROBERT J. URBAN
Federal Income Taxation-Tax Accounting-Effect of Events
Occurring After The Close of The Taxable Year On An Accrual
Taxpayer's Deductions-A corporate taxpayer on the accrual basis
accrued on its books on July 1, 1945 a capital stock tax which was
payable June 30, 1946. At the close of its fiscal year on August 31,
1945 an independent accounting firm audited the taxpayer's books for
the purpose of reports to stockholders, reports to creditor banks and
as a basis for filing tax returns. This audit was completed on October
30, 1945. On November 8, 1945, the capital stock tax was repealed.
The taxpayer, after obtaining extensions, filed its tax returns on Janu-
25 See e.g., J. I. Case, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 253 F. 2d 149 (7th Cir. March 12, 1958) :
"Particular circumstances in each case must be considered in determining
whether statutory obligations of the employer to bargain in good faith has
been met."
16 29 U.S.C.A. §158 (a) (5).
17 See Singer Mfg. Co. v. N.L.R.B., 119 F. 2d 131 (7th Cir. 1941), cert. denied,
313 U.S. 585.is White's Uvalde Mines v. N.L.R.B., supra note 5.
19 White's Uvalde Mines v. N.L.R.B., supra note 5, at 2005.
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